Semester 3rd

 Exposition of Pratyaksa and Anumana according to the Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

 

Exposition of Pratyaksa and Anumāna according to the Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

 Dignāga’s definition of Pratyakṣa:

Pratyaksha (प्रत्यक्ष/ perception)  literally means that which is perceptible to the eye or visible, in general usage it refers to being present, present before the eye i.e. within the range of sight, cognizable by any sense organ, distinct, evident, clear, direct, immediate, explicit, express, corporeal; it is a Pramana, mode of proof.

The master logician Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya presents the definition of pratyakṣa as thus: “pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādyasaṁyutam” i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā) that is from the association of name, class character, genus etc. The term ‘kalpanāpoḍha’ means free from conceptual construction which is definitely indicates the nirvikalpaka form of pratyakṣa; which is considered by the Buddhist logicians as the only form of pratyakṣa. According to them, it is only nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa which is real and unerring. The pure particular is the 60 object (ālambana) of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. The pure particular is called svalakṣaṇa that is grasped by us in nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

 Dharmakīrti’s definition of Pratyakṣa:

Dharmakīrti accepts Dignāga’s definition of pratyakṣa, but adds another epithet ‘abhrānta’ (non erroneous) to it. So his definition becomes: “tatra kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣam” i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is free from conceptual construction and which is non-erroneous. The word ‘tatra’ indicates localization (saptamī-arthe), but it is (moreover) used to indicate a selection. Thus the meaning of the sentence is the following one. ‘Tatra’ here means among pratyakṣa and anumāna. Pratyakṣa is here taken as subject and the characteristics of non-constructive and non-erroneous are predicated to it. It is non- constructive and containing no error. Dharmakīrti says, pratyakṣa as a presentation determined exclusively by the object and free from all conceptual constructions (kalpanā). Obviously it is nirvikalpaka knowledge, since savikalpaka knowledge involves the conceptual activity of the mind. Dharmakīrti is of opinion that names and relations are imposed by the mind, while the senses reveal the objects accurately unless they are themselves perverted by organic or extraneous causes. This pure pratyakṣa, free from all traces of conceptual activity, is said to give us the object in its own nature (svalakṣaṇam).

            Dharmaki̅rti recognizes sense perception or sensation as the source of right knowledge. In the third chapter of the Pramānavārtika and first chapter of Nyāya-bindu,  he discusses perception as a source of efficient knowledge which is without imagination and illusion. For him sensation or sense perception arises out of the object of perception. It is an effect of the object of perception. For him, there can be no perception without object of perception and vice -versa. As mentioned above for Dharmaki̅rti perception is described as a causal outcome. The presence of (all) the conditions of cognitions of consists in the presence of an individual entity and the totality of all other conditions of cognition. In his philosophy real cognition is a self complete process which produces self-consciousness in the mind of that individual. So, in his philosophy there are some significant characteristics of perception,

1) Perception according to Dharmaki̅rti is direct sense perception, which possesses efficiency.

2) Perception is the totally. It is different from productive imagination and can be justified by introspection.

3) Direct knowledge means here neither construction (judgement) nor illusion.

4) Perception in Dharmaki̅rti‟s philosophy is has characteristic of conciliation of the object of indirect knowledge.

5) Dharmaki̅rti does not exclude consciousness while explaining direct cognition or perception.

 

Dignāga’s definition of Anumāna:

 Anumāna (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumāna. Anumāna (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions.

A central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (linga) or the evidence (hetu) which led one to an inference (anumana) about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a fire. This topic of svārthānumāna (reasoning, literally "inference for oneself") is the subject of chapter two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration (parārthānumāna, literally "inference for others"), that is, how one communicates one's inferences through proper argument.

According to Richard Hayes, in Dignāga's system, to obtain knowledge that a property (the "inferable property", sadhya) is inherent in a "subject of inference" (paksa) it must be derived through an inferential sign (linga). For this to occur, the following must be true:

The inferential sign must be a property of the subject of the inference. That is, there exists in the subject of inference a property, which is different from the inferable property and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference; this second property may serve as an inferential sign in case it has two further characteristics.

The inferential sign must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject of inference, in which the inferable property occurs.

The inferential sign must not be known to occur in any other loci in which the inferable property is absent.

 Dharmaki̅rti’s definition of Anumāna

In the philosophy of Dharmaki̅rti, inference is twofold. They are inference for oneself (svārthnūmāna) and inference for others (parārthanūmāna). The first type of inference is internal and the later is verbal. In both of the cases the three aspects of logical marks are to be fulfilled. They are correspondence to the minor premise (pakṣadharmatva), to the major premise (anvaya) and to the contraposition of the major premise. In other words, firstly in order to be a valid inference the object cognized by inference must be present. Secondly it also must be present in all similar instances. Thirdly there must be an absolute absence of the object inferred in all dissimilar or negative cases. He discusses these two types of inference separately in detail in his philosophical works. The distinction between a source of cognition and its result is here just the same as in the case of perception. The usually cited example of direct knowledge in the philosophy of Dharmaki̅rti is of cognition of blue colour. Again, in case of inference the usually cited example is, wherever there is smoke there is also fire. There is smoke in that place. Therefore, there is fire. Here, in the case of perception an individual at first senses or cognizes the object immediately. Following by this sense-cognition, a mental sensation arises out of the same cause. In the third phase cooperation of the object of cognition and the immediately followed proper object of cognition is taken place. Dharmaki̅rti states about three phases in case of inference also. A cognition which is produced (indirectly) through a mark that has a threefold aspect, and which refers to an object, (not perceived, but) inferred – is internal inference. Inference taken place here regarding the object or the predicate can be either negation or identity or causation.

 

                       Different Kinds of Pramāṇa in Traditional Indian Philosophy

In India epistemology is an essential part of different part of different systems of philosophy. All schools of Indian philosophy, without exception accept a fact that epistemology is very important because they regard, ignorance as the root cause of human suffering. Therefore, they try to discuss carefully all aspects relating to the definition, means,validity and the way to achieve proper knowledge. this task is carried out to overcome suffering and to get liberation. 

Pramāṇa literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge”. It refers to epistemology in Indian philosophies, and is one of the key, much debated fields of study in Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism, since ancient times. It is a theory of knowledge, and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge

·         Hinduism (Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa schools) identifies six Pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths:

1.      Pratyakṣa (perception),

2.      Anumāṇa (inference),

3.      Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy),

4.      Arthāpatti (presumption, postulation, derivation from circumstances),

5.      Anupalabdhi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and

6.      Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).

·         Carvaka School

Carvaka School accepted only one valid source of knowledge i.e. Perception. It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid

·         Vaisheshika school

Epistemologically, the Vaiśeṣika School considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge:

1.     Perception (Pratyakṣa)

2.     Inference (Anumāna)

·         Jainism, Sankhya, Yoga, Vishishtadvaita Vedanta, and Dvaita Vedanta schools

According to the Sankhya, Yoga, and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas

1.     Pratyakṣa — perception

2.     Anumāna — inference

3.     Śabda — testimony/word of reliable experts

·         Nyaya school

The Nyāya School accepts four means of obtaining knowledge (pramāṇa), viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word.

1.     Perception, called Pratyakṣa

2.     Inference, called Anumāna,

3.     Comparison, called Upamāna.

4.     Word, or Śabda are also accepted as a pramāṇa.

·         Buddhism accepts only two Pramana as valid means to knowledge:

1.      Pratyaksha (perception) and

2.      Anumāṇa (inference).

 

Rinbochay adds that Buddhism also considers scriptures as third valid pramana, such as from Buddha and other "valid minds" and "valid persons". This third source of valid knowledge is a form of perception and inference in Buddhist thought. Valid scriptures, valid minds and valid persons are considered in Buddhism as Avisamvadin (incontrovertible, indisputable). Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism. In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

DETAILED SYLLABUS

Course No. PSBSTE305 Title: Buddhist Philosophy (Epistemology &

Logic)

Credits: 6 Maximum marks: 100

a) Minor Test I and II: 20+20 = 40

b) Semester Examination: 60

Duration of Minor Test: 01 hr. Duration of Semester

Syllabus for examinations to be held in December 2019, December 2020 & December 2021

Objectives: Acquaintance with the development of Buddhist Philosophy in the light of its

Epistemology and Logic.

SYLLABUS

Unit- I: Founders of Buddhist Logic and their Works.

Unit- II: Different kinds of Parmana in traditional Indian philosophy 

Unit- III: Exposition of pratyaksa and Anumana according to Dinnaga Dharmakiriti 

Unit- IV: Epistemological Study of Vaibhasika

Unit- V: Epistemological Study of Sautrantika

Unit- VI: Doctrine of Apoha.

Note for the Paper Setters:

The End Semester Question paper will consist of six sections, viz. A, B, C, D, E and

F spread over the six units, each containing one descriptive question with internal choice of

06 marks; and 04 objective type questions with multiple answers containing 1 mark each.

The examinee will be required to select the correct/most appropriate choice. Thus, the

descriptive/ analytical questions from all the six sections will carry 06 x 06=36 marks and

objective type questions will carry 06x04=24 marks.

Books Recommended:

1. Stcherbatsky : Buddhist logic vol. II ( English trans. By Nyayabindu,

Monton & Company, S. Grevenhage, 1958

2. Dhirendra Sharma : Apohasiddhi (English trans.)

3. Stcherbatsky : Buddhist logic, Col. I, Academy of Science of USSR,

Lengingrad, 1932 as vol. XXXVI part I of the

Bibliotheca Buddhica.

4. K.N. Jayatilake : Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, Allen & Unwin,

London, 1936.

5. D. N. Shastri : Critique of Indian Realism, Agra University, Agra,

1964.

6. S.C. Vidyabhushan : History of Indian Logic, Calcutta, 1929.

DETAILED SYLLABUS